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Abstract  
A renewed Cold War with a new Central Front in Europe threatens international security. NATO’s arc of 
crisis stretches from Ukraine in the northeast to Turkey and Syria in the south. The Warsaw Pact 
dissolved in 1991 but NATO’s nuclear posture continues to threaten Russians who fear NATO expansion. 
Evidence of heavy-handed U.S. diplomacy in Europe has raised concerns about American intentions in 
Ukraine. The failed 2015 negotiations surrounding the United Nations Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty indicate it is time the Nuclear Weapon States in the 29-member NATO alliance move 
NATO's posture away from the Strategic Concept toward nuclear disarmament rather than deterrence. 
Keywords: Canada, cyberwarfare, Middle powers, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Nuclear weapons, Russia, Strategic Concept, Ukraine, 
United States.  
Introduction 
Facing Russian recalcitrance over Crimea 
and Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is strengthening its 
conventional and nuclear defences along the 
Polish and Baltic borders [1].Recently the 
United States (US) announced it intends to 
modernize the B-61 bombers that carry 
NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons. In turn 
Russia threatened it might deploy nuclear 
missiles to Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea if 
the US upgrades its nuclear weapons in 
Germany [2]. 
 
NATO's nuclear posture refers to: the United 
States (US) triad of air-, sea- and land-based 
nuclear weapons, referred to as the 
"ultimate authority"; the United Kingdom's 
(UK) submarine-based Trident ballistic 
missiles; France's force de dissuasion of air-, 
sea- and land-based nuclear weapons; as 
well as approximately 100 tactical 
thermonuclear bombs deployed by the US 
within five so-called Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Turkey)  [3]. 
 
Evidence of heavy-handed U.S. diplomacy in 
Europe has raised concerns about American  
intentions in Ukraine. Apparently around 7 
p.m. on Friday, Feb. 13, 2015 about two 
dozen high-level U.S. diplomats, politicians 
and four-star generals held a discussion in a 
briefing room on the sixth floor of the luxury 
Bayerischer Hof hotel in Munich. Their 
frank comments behind a sound-proof door 
were leaked, perhaps to German intelligence 
but certainly to the German newspapers 
Bild and Der Spiegel, which published 
reports of the discussions [4]. 
 
Although not directly involved, the smaller 
NATO allies and the Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States (NNWS) can learn from the 
revelations. In future, middle-powers within 
NATO like Canada, France and Germany 
will be asked to contribute to NATO’s future 
operations in Ukraine. Like many Germans, 
Canadians tend to fear entrapment in a 
U.S.-led war, at the same time as they fear 
abandonment by NATO’s reputed leader. 
 
While German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
was earning public kudos for flying with 
French President Francois Hollande to 
Moscow to meet President Vladimir Putin in 
an effort to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine,  
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Obama’s top diplomat for Europe, Victoria 
Nuland, dismissed their diplomacy in the 
closed-door meeting as “Merkel’s Moscow 
thing” and “Merkel’s Moscow junk” [5]. Note 
that the quote above and the ones that 
follow, along with descriptions of the tone of 
the meeting and emotions ascribed to some 
of those inside, are from widely used English 
translations of original translations to 
German for use by the two German 
newspapers. 
 
The U.S. assistant secretary of state went on 
to criticize Germany, saying, “They’re afraid 
of damage to their economy, counter-
sanctions from Russia.” A U.S. politician 
says, “It’s painful to see that our NATO 
partners are getting cold feet.” A U.S. 
senator calls German Defence Minister 
Ursula von der Leyen “defeatist” because 
she no longer believes in a Kiev victory. 
According to German reports, the phrase 
“German defeatist” was often heard in the 
room [6]. 
 
Another U.S. official spoke about the 
Europeans’ “Moscow bullshit.” U.S. Sen. 
John McCain was in the meeting and was 
quoted as angrily asserting, “History shows 
us that dictators always take more, 
whenever you let them. They can’t be 
brought back from their brutal behaviour 
when you fly to Moscow to them, just like 
someone once flew to this city. Both 
newspapers reported Obama’s close 
confidante Nuland seemed to have been the 
one who set the tone, saying, “We can fight 
against the Europeans, we can fight with 
rhetoric against them.”  
 
Several U.S. politicians appear hesitant 
about supplying weapons to Kiev. One asks 
whether it is only a tactic, a false promise to 
get the Europeans to put more pressure on 
Putin. 
 
“No, it’s not a tactic to push the Europeans,” 
answers Nuland. “We’re not going to send 
any four divisions into Ukraine, as the 
Europeans fear. It’s only a relatively 
moderate delivery of anti-tank weapons.” 
 
“But what will we tell the Europeans if we 
really decide on delivering weapons?” asks 
one congressman. “What’s our story then?” 
 
 
NATO commander Gen. Philip Breedlove 
answers: “We’re not on a footing to deliver so 
many weapons they could defeat Russia. 
That’s not our goal. But we have to try to 
raise the battlefield cost for Putin, to slow 
down the whole problem, so sanctions and 
other measures can take hold.” 
 
Breedlove’s shocking attitude to collateral 
damage-referred to by him as a “battlefield 
cost”-has been carefully translated into 
German and then back again into English. 
 
Again top diplomat Nuland, who speaks 
fluent Russian and served as former U.S. 
vice-president Dick Cheney’s security 
adviser, tells them: “I’d strongly urge you to 
use the phrase ‘defensive systems’ that we 
would deliver to oppose Putin’s ‘offensive 
systems.’ ” Typical of groupthink and a 
dangerous esprit de corps, there is no doubt 
in Breedlove’s mind about what future U.S. 
arms deliveries to Ukraine should look like: 
“Russian artillery is by far what kills most 
Ukrainian soldiers, so a system is needed 
that can localize the source of fire and 
repress it. Ukrainian communications are 
disrupted or completely swamped, so they 
need uninterceptible communications gear. 
Then I won’t talk about any anti-tank 
rockets, but we are seeing massive supply 
convoys from Russia into Ukraine. The 
Ukrainians need the capability to shut off 
this transport. And then I would add some 
small tactical drones.” 
 
Modernizing communications and deploying 
military drones are NATO’s new mantras of 
modern warfare. Worries about a possible 
cyberwarfare attack by Russia against 
Ukraine have been exacerbated by the 
possibility that the U.S., Russia or Ukraine 
could strike first using cyber weapons and 
then the conflict could escalate to a possible 
nuclear exchange. 
 
Earlier in February 2015, another leaked “f--
k the EU” slur by Nuland in a telephone 
conversation was condemned by Merkel as 
“completely unacceptable [7]. Also 
unacceptable are Russia and NATO’s 
continued insistence on maintaining tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe, weapons which 
they perceive as essential to their security.  
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NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept reasserted 
in 2014 that, "As long as nuclear weapons 
exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance 
[8]. 
 
NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary in 
2019 and there will be fireworks. At at a 
high-level Inter-Action Council meeting in 
Toronto, Canada in January 2016, I asked 
Dr. Thomas Axworthy whether Canada’s 
new Minister of Global Affairs, Stephane 
Dion, should revisit NATO headquarters in 
Brussels with a view to raising questions 
about NATO’s reliance on deterrence, just 
like Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy did in 
1999-2000 when the U.S. labelled him a 
‘nuclear nag [9]. The small meeting of high-
level experts chaired by former Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien operates by 
Chatham house rules that require complete 
confidentiality but the idea of re-examining 
NATO’s reliance on deterrence is often 
raised among NATO critics. The United 
States’ allies need to ask themselves in the 
months leading up to NATO’s seventieth 
anniversary in 2019 and the 2020 NPT 
Review Conference whether nuclear 
weapons actually protect them.  Does the 
possession of nuclear weapons deter 
potential aggressors from attacking? 
Curiously, the leaders of the non-nuclear 
weapon states (NNWS) in NATO continue to 
profess their reliance on traditional nuclear 
deterrence, while the U.S. moved years ago 
toward a pre-emptive strategy that promises 
to strike first with nuclear weapons, even in 
the event of a limited chemical or biological 
attack [10]. The situation is similar to the 
late 1950s and 1960s when all the NATO 
allies continued to rely upon one 
permutation of nuclear deterrence-mutual 
assured destruction or MAD-even as the 
U.S. developed another permutation called 
‘flexible response’ [11]. 
 
To clarify, NATO’s ‘new’ Strategic Concept 
was asserted in 1991, reissued in 1999 and 
reconfirmed in 2000-2010. It links the 
NNWS in NATO to the overall nuclear 
policies of the NATO Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS). Over the last fifteen years, 
significant pressure to change NATO’s 
nuclear posture emanated from coalitions of 
states and NGOs, including the Article VI  
 
 
 
Forum, the International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the  
 
Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), the New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC), the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and Parliamentarians for 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
(PNND) [12]. Diplomats and high-level NGO 
representatives involved in the NPT Review 
Conferences, held every five years, often 
debated the implications of the NPT’s 
‘Article VI’ commitment for NATO’s 
Strategic Concept [13]. Diplomatic debates 
also took place during NPT preparatory 
committee (PrepCom) meetings and NPT 
Review Conferences (RevCons). The 
founding chairman of the Middle Powers 
Initiative (MPI) and the Article VI Forum, 
Canadian Senator (ret’d) Douglas Roche 
argued that since states, including all NATO 
member states, endorsed the NPT, NATO 
could no longer claim its nuclear weapons 
were “essential” [14].NATO headquarters 
was urged by many to rethink its policy but 
the Strategic Concept was reaffirmed stating 
that, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, 
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”[15]. 
 
Conversely, many bureaucrats, defence 
ministers, and parliamentarians believed 
that to ensure peace and prevent 
conventional war or coercion, the alliance 
had to maintain for the foreseeable future 
“an appropriate mix of nuclear and 
conventional capabilities.”16] NATO’s 2012 
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review 
reasserted that nuclear weapons are the 
“supreme guarantee of the security of the 
alliance” [17] leading to more debates at the 
2012-14 Prep Coms and 2015 Rev Con [18]. 
The 2015 RevCon ended in debacle and 
deadlock with no agreement on a final 
consensus document [19].Faced with 
Russian recalcitrance over Crimea and 
Ukraine, NATO began to strengthen its 
conventional and nuclear defences along the 
Polish and Baltic borders [20] and modernize 
the B-61 bombers that carry tactical nuclear 
weapons [21]. Russia announced it might 
deploy nuclear missiles to Kaliningrad on 
the Baltic Sea if the US upgraded its nuclear 
weapons in Germany [22].  
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Given Russian and American modernization 
and redeployments, an in-depth review of 
NATO’s nuclear doctrine will be needed, 
perhaps in time for NATO’s seventieth 
anniversary celebrations in 2019. Changes 
to the Strategic Concept might also be 
expected in the wake of changes to the U.S. 
Presidency. Notably previous efforts to 
change NATO’s deterrent policy began at the 
national level among NATO’s allies.  The 
thrust for NATO’s 1999 review essentially 
began because Canada’s parliament released 
a report calling for a re-examination of 
NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and 
the Strategic Concept. Canada’s Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy committed his 
department to attempt to change NATO’s 
nuclear doctrine-for which he was often 
labelled a ‘nuclear nag.’ Working together  
 
with the German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fisher, these critics of NATO policy 
attempted to persuade NATO diplomats that 
the alliance needed to reconsider its reliance 
on nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. 
In the final analysis, even American 
diplomats at NATO headquarters were 
impressed with the Canadian/German 
initiative and the determination of the 
Canadian Foreign Minister and his 
diplomatic aides [23].In a similar fashion, 
working together with other like-minded 
‘middle powers’ in NATO, such as Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, it 
might be possible to reassess NATO’s 
nuclear doctrine so as to ensure a new 
Central Front in Europe does not divide 
Ukraine, isolate Kaliningrad from Russia, 
and further antagonize Russia.  
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